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Opacity Enforcing Control Synthesis
Je´re´my Dubreil, Philippe Darondeau and Herve´ Marchand
INRIA Rennes - Bretagne Atlantique, Rennes, France
e-mail : {First.Last}@irisa.fr
Abstract— Given a finite transition system and a regular
predicate, we address the problem of computing a controller
enforcing the opacity of the predicate against an attacker (that
partially observes the system), supposedly trying to push the
system to reveal the predicate. Assuming that the controller can
only control a subset of the events it observes (possibly different
from the ones of the attacker), we show that an optimal control
always exists and provide sufficient conditions under which it
is regular and effectively computable. These conditions rely on
the inclusion relationships between the observable alphabets of
the attacker and the controller and the controllable alphabet.
Index Terms— control, security, opacity, discrete event sys-
tems, partial observation
I. INTRODUCTION
Opacity, whose goal is to oppose diagnosis, was intro-
duced in [1] and [2]. Given a system, equipped with a
map sending (prefixes of) executions to observations, an
opaque predicate is a set of executions such that every
execution in the set is observationally equivalent to some
execution outside the set. So, membership to an opaque
predicate is never disclosed by observation. Anonymity and
non-interference may be reduced to the opacity of suitable
predicates for suitable observation maps [2]. In this paper,
we concentrate on finite transition systems labelled over
an alphabet Σ, on predicates defined by regular sets of
execution traces in Σ∗, and on observation maps induced by
the projection of execution traces on a sub-alphabet Σa of Σ,
modeling the attacker’s alphabet. Under these assumptions,
opacity can be decided although it cannot be expressed in
the modal µ-calculus [3].
We are specially interested in cases when the predicate
of interest is non-opaque, i.e. the system leaks confidential
information. A possible arrangement is then to augment
the system with a monitor, responsible for detecting when
confidential information was leaked or will be leaked unless
one halts the system immediately. Assuming that monitors
observe only a subset Σm of the events of the system,
which needs not be a subset of Σa, necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of monitors were obtained in [4].
We want to take one step further by providing a controller
that does enforce the opacity of the predicate by disabling at
each stage (of an execution) the least subset of events such
that confidential information is not leaked sooner or later.
Assuming that controllers observe all events and all events
can be controlled, sufficient conditions for the existence of
finite state controllers were proposed in [5] (the opacity of
This work is partially supported by the RNRT Politess project.
several predicates is enforced there on concurrent attackers).
We consider here one predicate and one attacker, but we
relax the assumptions on controllable and observable events.
Namely, if Σ is the set of events of the system, let Σa ⊆ Σ be
the attacker’s alphabet, and let Σc and Σm be the subsets of
events controlled or observed by the controller, respectively,
then we assume that Σc ⊆ Σm and Σa compares both with
Σc and Σm.
Let L(G) ⊆ Σ∗ be the regular language of the system
G and let Lϕ ⊆ Σ∗ be the regular but non-opaque predicate
whose opacity should be enforced by control. Not taking into
account controllability and observability, there is a largest
subset L1 of L(G) such that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L1 and
Σa, and L1 is regular [5]. As Σc ⊆ Σm, there exists
a most permissive controller K1 confining the system to
L1 and K1 is regular. Unfortunately, this controller does
not always enforce the opacity of Lϕ (unless Σa ⊆ Σc
or Σm ⊆ Σa as we shall explain later on). The reason
why it fails to do so is that a complete description of the
closed-loop system may be available to the attacker and new
confidential information on the execution may be inferred
from this knowledge. To solve the problem, one might think
of iterating the construction, thus producing a decreasing
chain of regular languages L(G) = K0 ⊇ K1 ⊇ K2 ⊇ . . ..
Unfortunately, the iteration may be infinite, hence it may not
yield an effective construction of ∩iKi and it does not show
either that this limit is regular.
Our contribution is twofold. For the cases Σa ⊆ Σc
and Σm ⊆ Σa, we show that the optimal opacity control
can be computed within the framework of Ramadge and
Wonham’s theory. For the remaining case Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆
Σm
1
, for which the iteration may be infinite, we supply an
alternative algorithm that computes the limit of the infinite
iteration described above. The algorithm works in double
exponential time. We do not investigate optimizations nor
heuristics in this paper for our primary goal is to show that
the construction of the optimal opacity control is effective.
This work has loose relationship with the earlier work
done by Schneider on security automata [6], subsequently
extended to edit automata [7]. The goal pursued in [6] was
to produce interface automata that enforce security policies
Lϕ , meaning that the interface automaton rejects those inputs
from the environment that would lead the system to leave the
subset of safe execution prefixes Lϕ. In our case, the role of
the controller is not to confine the executions of the system
1Remember that Σa is assumed to compare with both Σc and Σm.
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to Lϕ but to the largest opaque subset of L(G) w.r.t. Lϕ and
Σa. On the other hand, whenever Σc ⊆ Σa, our controllers
may be seen as interface automata, as they reject events from
the attacker’s alphabet exclusively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
fixes some notation. Section 3 brings back the basics of
opacity properties and it sets the opacity control problem.
Section 4 brings back the theory of Supervisory Control.
Section 5, which is the core of the paper, contains our
contribution. Optimal opacity control is obtained whenever
Σc ⊆ Σm and Σa compares with both of them. Moreover,
we produce an example showing that the problem cannot be
solved in the framework of Ramadge and Wonham’s theory
when Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm. Section 6 is a brief conclusion
pointing to open problems.
II. NOTATIONS
Let Σ be a finite alphabet of events. A string is a finite
sequence of events. The set of all strings is denoted by Σ∗.
Any subset of Σ∗ is called a language over Σ. Let L be
a language over Σ. The prefix-closure of L is defined as
L = {s ∈ Σ∗ | ∃t ∈ Σ∗ s.t. st ∈ L}. We assume that
systems are Labelled Transitions Systems (LTS) as follows.
Definition 1 (LTS): An LTS over Σ is a 4-tuple G =
(QG,Σ, δG, q
G
0) where QG is a finite set of states, Σ is the
finite set of events of G, qG0 ∈ QG is the initial state, and
δG : QG × Σ→ QG is a partial transition function. ⋄
In the sequel, we write q a→G q′ if δ(q, a) = q′ and q
a
→G
if ∃q′ ∈ QG, q
a
→G q
′
. We extend →G to arbitrary sequences
by setting q ε→G q for all states q, and q
sσ
→G q
′ whenever
q
s
→G q
′′ and q′′ σ→G q′, for some q′′ ∈ QG, s ∈ Σ∗ and
σ ∈ Σ. We denote
TG = {(q, σ, q
′) ∈ Q× Σ×Q : q
σ
→ q′}
the set of transitions of G and L(G) = {l ∈ Σ∗ | qG0
l
→G} the
set of its execution traces. Given non-empty subsets IG, FG ⊆
QG, the definitions extend to LFG(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗ | ∃q ∈
FG, q
G
0
s
→G q} (the set of execution traces ending in a final
state of FG) and LIG,FG(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗ | ∃q′ ∈ IG, ∃q ∈
FG, q
′ s→G q} (the set of partial execution traces starting in
a state of IG and ending in a state of FG).
Opacity control aims at preventing an attacker A from de-
ducing confidential information on the execution of a system
from the observation of a subset of events Σa. To model
this, we use the classical notion of projection. We simply
denote by PΣa the projection from Σ∗ to Σ∗a that erases in a
sequence of Σ∗ all events not in Σa. This definition extends
to (regular) languages: PΣa(K) = {µ ∈ Σ∗a | ∃s ∈ K, µ =
PΣa(s)}. Conversely, given K ⊆ Σ∗a, the inverse projection
of K is P−1Σa (K) = {s ∈ Σ
∗ | PΣa(s) ∈ K}. Given an LTS
G over Σ and a set of observable events Σa ⊆ Σ, the set of
observed traces of G is PΣa(L(G)). Given two sequences
s, s′ ∈ Σ∗, we let s ∼a s′ in case PΣa(s) = PΣa(s′) and
denote [s]a = P−1Σa (PΣa(s)) the equivalence class of s.
Lemma 1: Let Σa ⊆ Σb ⊆ Σ, then s ∼b s′ ⇒ s ∼a s′.
III. THE BASICS OF OPACITY
Consider an LTS G over Σ, a regular predicate Lϕ ⊆ Σ∗,
and a sub-alphabet Σa ⊆ Σ. The alphabet Σa defines the
interface provided to the user for interacting with G. The
predicate Lϕ represents a confidential information on the
execution of G, i.e. if the current trace of execution is s ∈ Σ∗,
the user should not be able to deduce from PΣa(s) and G
that s ∈ Lϕ. In this setting, the user is considered as an
attacker (A) willing to catch the confidential information
and armed for this with full information on the structure of
G but only partial information upon its behavior, namely
the observed trace in Σ∗a. In order that the confidential
information is never leaked, it is necessary and sufficient
that Lϕ is an opaque predicate according to the following
definition, adapted from [2].
Definition 2 (Opacity): Lϕ is said to be opaque w.r.t.
L(G) and Σa if
∀s ∈ L(G), [s]a ∩ L(G) 6⊆ Lϕ (1)
In other words, Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(G) and Σa if and
only if ∀µ ∈ PΣa(L(G)), P−1Σa (µ) ∩ L(G) 6⊆ Lϕ, and
Lϕ is non-opaque w.r.t. L(G) and Σa if and only if ∃µ ∈
PΣa(L(G)), P
−1
Σa
(µ) ∩ L(G) ⊆ Lϕ.
Example 1: Consider the two specifications G1 and G2
of a coffee-machine depicted in Figures 1 and 2, and let
Σa = {coinIn, coinOut, cancel, confirm, coffeeOut}.
Consider the predicate Lϕ = Σ∗.full.Σ∗. Then, Lϕ is not
Fig. 1. The predicate Lϕ is non opaque w.r.t. G1 and Σa
opaque with respect to L(G1) and Σa, since e.g. for the
observed trace coinIn.coinOut for which the only possible
execution trace is coinIn.isCashFull.full.coinOut ∈ Lϕ.
A contrario Lϕ is opaque with respect to L(G2) and Σa.
If Lϕ is not opaque w.r.t. L(G) and Σa, then it is still
possible to restrict the behavior of G so that Lϕ becomes
opaque. This can be obtained by withdrawing from L(G) all
words u.v such that u ∼a u′ ⇒ u′ ∈ Lϕ for all u′ ∈ L(G).
Proposition 1 ([5]): Given a system G and a predicate
Lϕ, there exists a supremal prefix-closed sub-language of
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Fig. 2. The predicate Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. G2 and Σa
L(G), noted OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), such that Lϕ is opaque
w.r.t. OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) and Σa, and it is given by
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) =
L(G) \ ((L(G) \ P−1Σa (PΣa(L(G) \ Lϕ))).Σ
∗)
(2)
Intuitively, the language P−1Σa (PΣa(L(G) \ Lϕ)) is the set
of the “safe” sequences that do not reveal Lϕ2, whereas any
sequence in L(G)\P−1Σa (PΣa(L(G)\Lϕ)) reveals Lϕ (these
sequences are extended with Σ∗ because, once Lϕ has been
revealed, this holds for ever).
It follows from proposition 1 that OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) is
the union of all prefix-closed sub-languages L′ of L(G),
such that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L′ and Σa [5]. There-
fore, OP↑ is monotone in the first argument. Note that
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) can be empty. In that case, there is no
way to enforce opacity by restricting the behavior of the
system.
Remark 1: If Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L1 and L2, then it is
opaque w.r.t. L1 ∪ L2, but not necessarily w.r.t. L1 ∩ L2.
Similarly, if L1 ⊆ L ⊆ L2, Lϕ may be opaque w.r.t. L but
not opaque w.r.t. L1 or L2. ⋄
Next, we establish a helpful lemma, stating that if a se-
quence s belongs to OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), then any sequence
in L(G) observationally equivalent to s also belongs to
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa).
Lemma 2: ∀s ∈ OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa),
[s]a ∩ L(G) ⊆ OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa)
Proof: Let s′ ∈ [s]a ∩ L(G), then by definition
s ∼a s
′ and s′ ∈ L(G). Suppose for a contradiction that
s′ /∈ OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), then s′ = uv for some u such
that u ∼a u′ ⇒ u′ ∈ Lϕ for all u′ ∈ L(G). As s ∼a s′,
s = u”v” for some u” ∈ L(G) such that u ∼a u”. Therefore,
u” ∼a u
′ ⇒ u′ ∈ Lϕ for all u′ ∈ L(G), showing that
s /∈ OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), a contradiction.
Dually, this lemma implies that if a sequence s belongs to
L(G)\OP↑(Lϕ, L(G),Σa), then no sequence observationally
2Note that this language is not prefix-closed.
equivalent to s belongs to OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa). In other
words, when computing the supremal sub-language of L(G)
with respect to which Lϕ is opaque, each equivalence class
of L(G) w.r.t. Σa is either entirely kept or removed.
Our goal is to enforce opacity by supervisory control,
which puts strong conditions on the admissible restrictions
of L(G) (due to the so-called controllability and observ-
ability conditions that a controller has to fulfill to be imple-
mentable). We will also compute the most permissive opacity
control in the form of a regular sub-language of L(G). Next
section brings back a few notions of supervisory control
theory.
IV. THE BASICS OF SUPERVISORY CONTROL
Given a prefix-closed behavior K ⊆ L(G) ⊆ Σ∗ expected
from the system G, the goal of supervisory control is to
enforce this behavior on G by pairing this system with a
monitor (also called controller) that observes a subset Σm
of the events in Σ and controls a subset Σc of the events in
Σ, i.e. enables or disables each instance of these controllable
events. Σ \ Σc is the set of uncontrollable events. Σ \ Σm
is the set of unobservable events. We now recall some basic
concepts of supervisory control theory. More information on
the computational aspects can be found in [8].
Definition 3: A prefix-closed language K ⊆ L(G) is
controllable w.r.t. L(G) and Σc if K.(Σ \Σc)∩L(G) ⊆ K.
This definition states that if K is controllable, then no
uncontrollable events need to be disabled to exactly confine
the system L(G) to K. Note that the union of an arbitrary
number of controllable languages is controllable.
Definition 4: Assuming that Σc ⊆ Σm, a prefix-
closed language K is observable w.r.t. L(G) and Σm if
P−1Σm [PΣm(K)] ∩ L(G) ⊆ K
3
.
Intuitively, K is observable, if K can be exactly recovered
from its projection PΣm(K) and L(G). Note that this is a
necessary condition for a controller that forces the system
to behave like K to be implementable. In other words, from
a control point of view, when disabling an event c after the
execution of s, then c has to be disabled after all execution
traces of [s]m. Under the assumption Σc ⊆ Σm, the union of
an arbitrary number of observable languages is observable.
Therefore, under this assumption, both controllability and
observability are stable under union of languages, and there
exists a supremal controllable and observable prefix-closed
sub-language of K, that we denote
CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) (3)
The language CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) represents the largest
behavior included in K(⊆ L(G)) that can be enforced by
control. Moreover, CO↑ is monotone in the first argument.
Lemma 3: Assuming that Σc ⊆ Σm, let s ∈ K \
CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm), then
[s]m ∩ CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) = ∅
3Note that we have given here the formal definition of normality. Under
the assumption Σc ⊆ Σm, observability and normality coincide [9].
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Proof: Because CO↑(K,L(G),Σc,Σm) is observable,
this set and its relative complement are unions of equivalence
classes of ∼m.
Similarly to lemma 2, the equivalence classes of L(G)
w.r.t. Σm are preserved by control.
V. ENFORCING OPACITY BY CONTROL
Our purpose is to solve the opacity control problem stated
as follows.
Problem: Show that the set of controllable and observable
restrictions (i.e. sub-languages) of L(G) enforcing
the opacity of Lϕ either is empty or has a great-
est element and compute this maximal permissive
controllable and observable sub-language of L(G).
In the sequel, we shall assume that an attacker has a
full knowledge of the structure of G, knows the interface
of the controller Σm and is able to perform in his head
all calculations that the administrator has made to compute
this controller. In particular, this entails that the structure of
the controlled system may be available to the attacker, thus
possibly inducing new confidential information flow. This
assumptions are at present informal, but might be formalized
e.g. using language theory and epistemic logic. Moreover, in
the rest of the paper, it is always assumed that Σc ⊆ Σm
(the controllable events are observed by the controller).
A. Characterization of the solution
We now investigate the existence of a supremal solution
to the opacity control problem. To do so, we consider the set
Cϕ = {L ⊆ L(G) | Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L and Σa,
L is prefix-closed,
L is controllable w.r.t. L(G) and Σc,
L is observable w.r.t. L(G) and Σm}
and the prefix-closed language
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) =
⋃
L∈Cϕ
L (4)
Proposition 2: If CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) 6= ∅,
then it is the supremal sub-language of L(G) such that
(1) CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is controllable
and observable w.r.t. L(G), Σc and Σm,
(2) and Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) and Σa.
Otherwise, no control can enforce the opacity of Lϕ.
Proof: If CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) 6= ∅, then it
is the union of an arbitrary number of languages that are con-
trollable, observable and such that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. the cor-
responding restrictions of L(G). These three properties are
stable under arbitrary union of languages (under the hypoth-
esis that Σc ⊆ Σm). So CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
satisfies (1) and (2).
Even though the previous proposition entails the existence
of a unique maximal sub-language of L(G), that is control-
lable, observable and in restriction to which Lϕ is opaque,
we still have to examine whether this language is regular (or
at least, to exhibit sufficient conditions for regularity) and to
provide an effective computation of this language.
It may be remarked that restricting languages to en-
sure controllability and observability does not always pre-
serve opacity and the other way round (See Example 2).
Thus, in a first attempt towards an effective computation
of CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc), following the classical
methodology of Supervisory Control Theory4, we establish
below a fix-point characterization of this language by alter-
nating the computation of the supremal sub-language that
ensures the opacity of Lϕ and the supremal controllable and
observable sub-language.
Consider the operator
K(•) = CO↑(OP↑(•, Lϕ,Σa), L(G),Σc,Σm).
Remark that K(•) is monotone w.r.t. set inclusion. Now, as
the prefix-closed subsets of L(G) form a complete sub-lattice
of P(Σ∗), it follows from Knaster-Tarski’s Theorem [10]
that K(•) has a greatest fix-point in this sub-lattice. Let
K(L(G), Lϕ) be the greatest fix-point of the operator K(•)
included in L(G)5.
Proposition 3:
K(L(G), Lϕ) = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
Proof: We denote Lc =
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc). Clearly, Lϕ is opaque
w.r.t. K(L(G), Lϕ) and Σa. This language is controllable
and observable, hence K(L(G), Lϕ) ⊆ Lc.
Moreover, we have Lc ⊆ L(G) = K0(L(G)). Assume
now that Lc ⊆ Ki(L(G)) for some i. Then, from the
monotony of K(•), we get Ki+1(L(G)) ⊇ K(Lc) = Lc,
since Lc controllable and observable and Lϕ is opaque
w.r.t. Lc and Σa. By transfinite induction, it follows that
Lc ⊆ Kα(L(G)) for every ordinal α. Therefore Lc ⊆
∩αK
α(L(G)) = K(L(G), Lϕ).
Note that this fix-point characterization of
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) does not ensure that
this language can be always computed by a finite iteration
as the following example shows.
Example 2: Consider the LTS G shown in Fig. 3 where
Σa = {A,B, c}, Σm = Σ, Σc = {c} and the predicate Lϕ
is the set of the sequences that reach the states represented
with squares in G. Let Ki = Ki(L(G)) denote the language
computed after i iterations of the operator K(•).
A
c c c
uu
B
A
cc B
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
c
Fig. 3. L(G) and Lϕ
In L(G), the sole string that belongs to Lϕ, and therefore
reveals it, is c.c.A, which requires to disable the second event
4that ensures both non-blocking and controllability
5K(L(G), Lϕ) is also the greatest fix-point of the operator K′ =
OP↑(CO↑(•, L(G),Σc,Σm), Lϕ,Σa).
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c, seeing that A is uncontrollable. The LTS that generates K1
is represented in Fig. 4(a). In K1, c.c.A has disappeared and
(a)
(b)
c
c c c
uu
B
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
u
cc
u
c c c
uu
B
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
c
u
c
c
c
c B
c B
Fig. 4. K1 and K2
the sole string that belongs to Lϕ, and therefore reveals it, is
c.u.c.c.B, which requires to disable the event c after c.u.c.
The result (K2) is depicted in Fig. 4(b). After 2i iterations of
the operator K(•), one gets the language K2i generated by
the LTS depicted in Fig. 5(a). In K2i, the string (c.u)2i.c.c.A
(a)
(b) B
c c c
uu
B
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
(c.u)2i
c c c
uu
A
A
∈ Lϕ
∈ Lϕ
c c
c B
Bc
c c
(c.u)2i+1
Fig. 5. K2i and K2i+1
reveals Lϕ and it must be eliminated by disabling the last c,
which is done in the language K2i+1 (See Fig. 5(b). But, in
K2i+1, the string (c.u)2i+1.c.c.B reveals Lϕ. Disabling the
last c leads to K2i+2, which reproduces the situation found in
K2i (up to replacing the prefix (c.u)2i by (c.u)2i+2. Finally,
even though the limit K(L(G), Lϕ) of this decreasing chain
is the regular language (c.u.c.u)∗, the fix-point iteration pro-
duces a strictly decreasing and infinite sequence of languages
Kj showing that the above algorithm may not terminate. ⋄
In the rest of the paper, we investigate sufficient conditions,
induced by relations between the alphabets Σc, Σa and Σm,
under which CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is regular and
one can effectively compute uniformly from the arguments
of CO-OP↑(•) a finite automaton generating this optimal
opacity control.
But first, we establish a proposition that helps to simplify
the remaining proofs (In Sections V-B.2 and V-B.3). This
proposition states that whenever Σa ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ, we can
reformulate the control problem in terms of the observed
system w.r.t. Σm and a new predicate Lmϕ ⊆ Σ∗m derived
from Lϕ and Σm, solve the problem in this new setting (thus,
under full observation) and lift up the solution to the initial
setting. The intuition is that observing events from Σ \ Σm
could not help the controller anyway.
Proposition 4: Assume that Σa ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ and Σc ⊆
Σm. Let Lϕ, L(G) ⊆ Σ∗, then
CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) =
P−1Σm(CO-OP
↑(PΣm(L(G)), L
m
ϕ ,Σa,Σm,Σc)) ∩ L(G)
where Lmϕ = {ρ ∈ PΣm(L(G)) : P−1Σm(ρ) ∩ L(G) ⊆ Lϕ}
Proof: Consider the following languages:
• K = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc),
• F = CO-OP↑(PΣm(L(G)), Lmϕ ,Σa,Σm,Σc)
• H = P−1Σm(F ) ∩ L(G).
We will prove that H = K.
Let us first prove that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. H and Σa.
Consider s ∈ H ∩ Lϕ. As PΣm(s) ∈ F and Lmϕ is opaque
w.r.t. F and Σa (by definition of F ), there exists ρ ∈ F
such that ρ ∼a PΣm(s) and ρ ∈ F \ Lmϕ . Then, ∃s′ ∈
P−1Σm(ρ) ∩ L(G), s
′ 6∈ Lϕ according to the definition of Lmϕ .
But ρ ∈ F implies that s′ ∈ H . PΣm(s′) ∼a PΣm(s) and
Σa ⊆ Σm implies that s′ ∼a s. So Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. H
and Σa.
Let us now show that H is controllable. Consider s ∈
H,σ ∈ Σ \ Σc such that sσ ∈ L(G). Let ρ = PΣm(s). By
definition of H , we get ρ ∈ F .
• If σ 6∈ Σm then PΣm(sσ) = ρ and finally sσ ∈ H .
• If σ ∈ Σm, we have ρ ∈ F and ρσ ∈ PΣm(L(G)). As
F is controllable, we get ρσ ∈ F , which entails sσ ∈ H
as sσ ∈ P−1Σm({ρσ}).
Finally we note that H is observable by construction. As K
is the supremal controllable and observable sub-language of
L(G) for which Lϕ is opaque, we can conclude that H ⊆ K.
Let us now prove that PΣm(K) ⊆ F .
• Let ρ ∈ PΣm(K). There exists s ∈ K such that
PΣm(s) = ρ. Since Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. K and Σa,
there exists s′ ∈ K, s′ ∼a s such that s′ ∈ K \ Lϕ.
Let ρ′ = PΣm(s′). We have ρ′ 6∈ Lmϕ . As ρ ∼a ρ′, we
conclude that Lmϕ is opaque w.r.t. PΣm(K) and Σa.
• Let us show that PΣm(K) is controllable w.r.t.
PΣm(L(G)) and Σc. Let ρ ∈ PΣm(K) and σ ∈ Σm\Σc
such that ρσ ∈ PΣm(L(G)). Then, ∃s ∈ K ⊆ L(G),
such that PΣm(s) = ρ and sσ ∈ K(Σm \ Σc) ∩ L(G).
Since K is controllable, sσ ∈ K and then ρσ =
PΣm(sσ) ∈ PΣm(K). So PΣm(K) is controllable.
Now, PΣm(K) is obviously observable and we get that
PΣm(K) ⊆ F . This implies that P−1Σm(PΣm(K)) ∩ L(G) ⊆
H and since K = K ∩L(G) ⊆ P−1Σm(PΣm(K))∩L(G), we
conclude that K ⊆ H and finally that H = K.
B. Effective computation of the supremal solution
Next, we investigate three sufficient conditions under
which CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is regular and effec-
tively computable.These conditions bear upon the inclusion
relationships between the alphabets Σa, Σm and Σc.
32
1) Assumption 1: Σc ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σ: Under this
assumption, the controller observes and controls only a part
of the actions of the attacker, meaning that it is less powerful
than the attacker. Nevertheless, this is a sufficient condition
allowing to solve the control problem.
Proposition 5: Assume Σc ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σ, then
K1 (= K(L(G))) = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is
regular and effectively computable.
Proof: Let L1 = OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), then K1 =
CO↑(L1, L(G),Σc,Σm). Consider s ∈ K1 ∩ Lϕ. As Lϕ is
opaque w.r.t. L1 and Σa, ∃s′ ∈ L1 such that s ∼a s′ and s′ /∈
Lϕ. As Σm ⊆ Σa and s ∼a s′, we get s ∼m s′. Hence, as an
immediate consequence of Lemma 3, we also have s′ ∈ K1,
which entails that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. K1 and Σa. Hence,
K1 = K(L(G), Lϕ), which according to Proposition 3
entails that K1 = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc).
2) Assumption 2: Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ: This assumption
simply means that the controller can observe all the actions
of the attacker and control them.
Based on proposition 4, one can assume, without loss of
generality, that Σm = Σ.
Proposition 6: Assume Σa ⊆ Σc ⊆ Σm = Σ, then
K1 (= K(L(G))) = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σm,Σc) is
regular and effectively computable.
Proof: We first show that OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) is
controllable with respect to L, Σc. Consider s ∈
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) and σ /∈ Σc, such that sσ ∈ L(G).
As Σa ⊆ Σc, σ /∈ Σa and then sσ ∈ [s]a ∩ L(G) and
according to Lemma 2, sσ ∈ OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), which is
then controllable w.r.t. L, Σc and observable w.r.t. Σc and
Σm since Σm = Σ. Hence,
CO↑(OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa), L(G),Σc,Σm) =
OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa) = K(L(G), Lϕ)
and we conclude using the result of Proposition 3.
3) Assumption 3: Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm ⊆ Σ: Under this
assumption, even though all actions of the attacker can be
observed by the controller, only a part of them can be
controlled. One can think that the controller can filter out
the requests sent by the attacker to the system, whereas the
outputs of the system cannot be disabled by the controller.
This is for example the behavior of a firewall for Internet
services.
It is easy to check that the system of Example 2, for
which the fix-point computation does not terminate, fulfills
the assumption of this subsection. This leads us to design a
new algorithm.
Using proposition 4, we can assume that Σm = Σ.
We also make the following assumption without loss of
generality. The system is given by a deterministic LTS G =
(QG,Σ, q
G
0 , δG). The predicate Lϕ is specified by a complete
and deterministic LTS Sϕ = (QS ,Σ, qS0 , δS) with a set Fϕ
of final states such that Lϕ = LFϕ(Sϕ) and L(Sϕ) = Σ∗.
First, we compute the product of G and Sϕ in order to
tag the states in which the predicate Lϕ is satisfied: Gϕ =
G ‖ Sϕ = (Q,Σ, q0, δ), with Q = QG ×QS , q0 = (qG0 , qS0 )
and δ the synchronized transition function. By denoting F =
QG × Fϕ, we get LF (Gϕ) = L(G) ∩ Lϕ, meaning that the
execution traces that reach or go through a state of F reveal
Lϕ (note that L(Gϕ) = L(G), because Sϕ is complete).
Thus, Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ) ⇔ Lϕ is opaque w.r.t.
L(G). Clearly, if Lϕ is non-opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ) \ Σ∗ΣcΣ∗
and Σa, then no control can enforce the opacity of Lϕ. So
in the sequel, without loss of generality, we assume that Lϕ
is opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ) \Σ∗ΣcΣ∗ and Σa. In particular, this
entails that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ) \ Σ∗c .
Under this assumption, we show that the optimal opacity
control may be enforced by a finite state controller, defined
by a deterministic LTS C = (Q,Σ,Θ0, δ) with the set of
states
Q = {(X, q) : q ∈ X ⊆ Q}
and the initial state Θ0 = (X0, q0) specified by
X0 = {q ∈ Q : ∃s ∈ (Σ \ Σa)
∗, q0
s
→ q}
Intuitively, after the execution of a trace s, the controller
is in a state (X, q) when the controlled system is in state
q (recall that Σm = Σ) and X is the best estimate of the
current state of Gϕ that the attacker A can get from the
observation PΣa(s) of this execution trace. In particular, if
no event in Σa has been produced yet, the best estimate is X0
(recall that the attacker has full knowledge of the structure
of Gϕ)6.
In the sequel, we denote T the set of transitions of Gϕ.
The main task, for completing the construction of C, is to
determine the map α : 2Q −→ 2T that tells, for each state
(X, q) and simultaneously for all q ∈ X , which set α(X)
of controllable transitions of Gϕ the controller does enable,
thus
α(X) ⊆ α0(X)
∆
= {q
σ
→ q′ ∈ T : q ∈ X, q′ ∈ Q,σ ∈ Σc}.
So, in state (X, q), the controller disables the transitions q σ→
q′ ∈ α0(X) \ α(X), all of which are controllable.
Suppose the correct map α has been computed. Then the
set TC (of transitions of C) is inductively defined as the
least set of transitions (X, q) σ→C (X ′, q′) such that (X, q)
is reachable, q σ→ q′, and the estimate X ′ of the attacker is
updated from X as follows:
• if σ /∈ Σa, then X ′ = X
• if σ ∈ (Σa \ Σc), then
X ′ = { q′ : ∃q ∈ X, ∃s ∈ Σ∗, q
s
→ q′ and σ ∼a s} (5)
• if σ ∈ Σc, then
X ′ = {q” : ∃q ∈ X : ∃q′ ∈ Q, ∃s ∈ Σ∗,
q
σ
→ q′ ∈ α(X) and q′ s→ q” and s ∼a ǫ}
(6)
This is coherent with the idea that the attacker has full
knowledge of the structure of C, hence of α.
Lemma 4: Let (X, q) σs→C (X ′, q′) with σ ∈ Σa and s ∈
(Σ \Σa)
∗
, then ∀q′ ∈ X ′, ∃q ∈ X , (X, q) w→C (X ′, q′) with
w ∼a σ.
6Some states in Q will possibly be not reachable, but it does not matter
since these states can be eliminated afterwards by trimming C.
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Lemma 5: Let Θ0
s
→C (X, q) and Θ0
s′
→C (X
′, q′). If
s ∼a s
′ then X = X ′.
Both lemmas are immediate consequences of the definition
of TC .
We explain now the motivation under the definition of the
map α. Let (X, q) be a reachable state of the controller, thus
q ∈ X , and let q σ→ q′ ∈ T with σ ∈ Σc. If, for some
s ∈ (Σ\Σc)
∗
, q′
s
→ q” ∈ F but σs ∼a s′ for no sequence s′
such that q s
′
→ q” /∈ F for some q ∈ X , then the controller
C should disable q σ→ q′ when in state (X, q). Hence, one
should have q σ→ q′ /∈ α(X).
X
q′ /∈ F
q” ∈ Fs
q q” ∈ F
w
∼a
w′
q′q
σ
σ
But now suppose that, for some w,w′ ∈ (Σ \ Σc)∗ and
q ∈ X , q′, q” ∈ Q, q
σw
→ q” ∈ F , w ∼
a
w′, and
q′
w′
→ q′ /∈ F (thus ¬(s ∼
a
w′)). If q σ→ q′ /∈ α(X), and
the attacker has full knowledge of C and the map α, the
transition sequence q σw→ q” may now reveal the predicate
Lϕ, since the attacker knows that the masking transition
sequence q σw
′
→ q′ is disabled by C. Therefore, α(X) must
be computed iteratively as the limit of a decreasing chain
started from the finite set α0(X).
The definition of α(X) is as follows. Let T range over
the subsets of α0(X), and for σ ∈ Σc, let
Next(X,σ, T )
∆
= {q′ ∈ Q : ∃q ∈ X, q
σ
→ q′ ∈ T}
then
α(X)
∆
= gfp(λT.α0(X) ∩Accept(X,T )), (7)
where Accept(X,T ) = T \Bad(X,T ) letting
Bad(X,T )
∆
= {t ∈ T : t = q
σ
→ q′, q ∈ X, σ ∈ Σc,
PΣa(L{q′},F (G) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗)\
PΣa(LNext(X,σ,T ),(Q\F )(G)) 6= ∅}
All transitions in Bad(X,T ) should be disabled by con-
trol, because they may lead to a confidential information
flow by triggering one controllable event followed by an
uncontrollable sequence of events.
Remark 2: The controller C is computed by independent
iterations of the operator Accept(X,T ) for all X ⊆ Q and
T ⊆ α0(X). ⋄
We will now prove that Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(C), that
L(C) is controllable and observable, and that it is the supre-
mal sub-language of L(G) = L(Gϕ) with these properties.
Proposition 7: Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(C) and Σa
Proof: Consider s ∈ L(C) ∩ Lϕ ⊆ L(G).
• If PΣc(s) = ε, then s /∈ Σ∗ΣcΣ∗. As by hypothesis
Lϕ is opaque w.r.t. L(Gϕ) \ (Σ∗ΣcΣ∗) and Σa, there
exists s′ ∈ L(Gϕ) such that s′ ∼a s and s′ 6∈ Lϕ.
Since Σc ⊆ Σa, we also have PΣc(s′) = ε and hence
s′ ∈ L(C).
• if PΣc(s) 6= ε, then s can be decomposed as s = s1cs2
with c ∈ Σc and s2 ∈ (Σ\Σc)∗. There exists (X, q) ∈ Q
and q1 ∈ Q such that Θ0
s1→ (X, q) and (q c→ q1) ∈
α(X). Let (X, q) c→C (X ′, q1), thus
X ′ = {q” ∈ Q : ∃q′ ∈ Next(X, c, α(X)),
∃s ∈ Σ∗, q′
s
→ q” and s ∼a ǫ}
Assume for a contradiction that ∀q′1 ∈ X ′,
∀s′2 ∈ [s2]a, (X
′, q′1)
s′
2→C (Z, q
′
2) entails q′2 ∈
F . Then s′2 ∈ L{q′
1
},F (Gϕ) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗ and
PΣa(s2) /∈ PΣa(LX′,(Q\F )(Gϕ)), hence (q
c
→ q1) ∈
Bad(X,α(X)), in contradiction with (X, q) c→C
(X ′, q1). Therefore, (X ′, q′1)
s′
2→C (Z, q
′
2) for some q′1 ∈
X ′, s′2 ∈ [s2]a, and q′2 /∈ F . Now, (X, q)
c
→C (X
′, q1)
and q′1 ∈ X ′ entail that (X, q)
cs′
→C (X
′, q′1) for some
q ∈ X and s′ ∈ (Σ\Σa)∗ (Lemma 4), and q ∈ X entails
that Θ0
s′
1→C (X, q) for some s′1 ∼a s1 (Lemma 4).
Altogether, s = s1cs2 ∼a s′1cs′s′2 ∈ L(C) \Lϕ. So Lϕ
is opaque w.r.t. L(C) and Σa.
Proposition 8: L(C) is controllable w.r.t. L(Gϕ) and Σc.
Proof: Let s ∈ L(C) and σ ∈ Σ \ Σc such that sσ ∈
L(Gϕ). Then, ∃(X, q) ∈ Q such that Θ0
s
→ (X, q) in C and
∃q′ ∈ Q such that q σ→ q′ in Gϕ. Since σ 6∈ Σc, (X, q)
c
→C
(X ′q′) for some q′ by definition of TC , hence sσ ∈ L(C).
Theorem 1: Assume that Σc ⊆ Σa ⊆ Σm = Σ, then
L(C) = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σ,Σc)
Proof: Let K = CO-OP↑(L(G), Lϕ,Σa,Σ,Σc). Since Lϕ
is opaque w.r.t. L(C) and Σa, L(C) is controllable w.r.t.
L(Gϕ) and Σc, and L(C) is observable w.r.t. Σm and L(G)
(as Σm = Σ), we have L(C) ⊆ K.
It remains to prove that K ⊆ L(C). We proceed by
contradiction. Let s ∈ K \ L(C). This sequence can be
decomposed as s = s1σs2, where s1 is the longest prefix
of s such that [s1]a ∩K = [s1]a ∩ L(C), hence s1 ∈ L(C)
(since s1 ∈ K), [s1σ]a ∩K 6= [s1σ]a ∩ L(C) (by definition
of s1), and σ ∈ Σa (because [s1σ]a 6= [s1]a).
Since L(C) ⊆ K, [s1σ]a∩L(C) ⊂ [s1σ]a∩K and one can
find u = u1σu2 in [s1σ]a ∩K, with u1 ∼a s1 and u2 ∼a ǫ,
such that u1σu2 /∈ L(C). As s1 ∈ L(C) ∩ K, u1 ∼a s1
and u1 ∈ K, necessarily u1 ∈ L(C) by definition of s1. As
u1 ∈ L(C), u2 ∈ (Σ \ Σc)
∗
, u1σu2 ∈ L(Gϕ) \ L(C), and
L(C) is controllable, necessarily u1σ /∈ L(C) and σ ∈ Σc.
Since u1 ∈ L(C), there exists (X, q) ∈ Q such that Θ0
u1→
(X, q). By construction of C, q0
u1→ q in Gϕ, q ∈ X , and
X = {q1 ∈ Q : ∃u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C), q0
u
→ q1}. It also
follows from the construction of C that
α(X) = {q1
c
→ q2 : q1 ∈ X, q2 ∈ Q, c ∈ Σc s.t.
∃u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C), q0
u
→ q1 and uc ∈ L(C)}
and moreover, for all q1
c
→ q2 ∈ α(X), ∀u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C),
q0
u
→ q1 ⇒ uc ∈ L(C). Therefore, u1 ∈ [u1]a∩L(C), q0
u1→
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q, σ ∈ Σc, and u1σ /∈ L(C) entail that α(X) contains no
transition q σ→ q′.
Consider now the alternative set of transitions
β = {q1
c
→ q2 : q1 ∈ X, q2 ∈ Q,σ ∈ Σc
s.t. ∃u ∈ [u1]a ∩K, q0
u
→ q1 and uσ ∈ K}
Then clearly α(X) ⊆ β (because L(C) ⊆ K) and β contains
a transition q σ→ q′ (because q0 u1→ q, u1σ ∈ K, and K ⊆
L(Gϕ)). Therefore, α(X) ⊂ β.
In order to complete the proof, we will show that (q1
c
→
q2) /∈ Bad(X,β) for all c ∈ Σc and (q1
c
→ q2) ∈ β, entailing
that Accept(X,β) = β \ Bad(X,β) = β, and hence that
β ⊆ α(X) in view of the greatest fixpoint definition of α(X),
resulting in a contradiction with α(X) ⊂ β.
Let (q1
c
→ q2) ∈ Bad(X,β). Recalling that Bad(X,β) ⊆
β and that [u1]a = [s1]a, let u ∈ [u1]a ∩ L(C) = [u1]a ∩K
such that Θ0
u
→C (X, q1) and uc ∈ K. As (q1
c
→ q2) ∈
Bad(X,β), there must exist v ∈ (Σ \Σc)∗ such that ucv ∈
Lϕ∩L(Gϕ). K is controllable, hence ucv ∈ K. Lϕ is opaque
w.r.t. K and Σa, then ∃w ∈ [ucv]a ∩ K such that w 6∈
Lϕ. As w ∈ [ucv]a and c ∈ Σc ⊆ Σa, there should exist
w1, w2 ∈ Σ
∗ such that w = w1cw2 with w1 ∼a u ∼a u1
and w2 ∼a v. Now, w1 ∈ [u1]a∩K ⇒ w1 ∈ [u1]a∩L(C)⇒
∃q3 ∈ X , Θ0
w1→ (X, q3) in C, by Lemma 5. As w1c ∈ K,
there must exist q4 ∈ Q such that (q3
c
→ q4) ∈ β and thus
q4 ∈ Next(X, c, β). Now, v ∈ L{q2},F (G) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)∗,
w2 ∈ L{q4},(Q\F )(G)∩(Σ\Σc)
∗
, and v ∼a w2, so based on
the definition of the Bad operator, (q1
c
→ q2) 6∈ Bad(X,β),
which is the expected contradiction.
Example 3: To illustrate the algorithm, let us come back
to our previous example, where F = {3, 11}.
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Fig. 6. L(G) and Lϕ
At the first step of the computation of L(C), we get X0 =
{0}, Θ0 = (X0, 0)) and α0(X0) = {(0 c→ 1)}. Now, we also
have PΣa(L(Gϕ, 1, F )∩(Σ\Σc)∗) = ∅, implying (0
c
→ 1) /∈
Bad(X0, α0(X0)), and thus α(X0) = {(0
c
→ 1)}. Thus, in
C, we have Θ0
c
→C ({1, 6}, 1).
Further, for X1 = {1, 6}, we get α0(X1) = {(1 c→ 2), (6 c→
7)}, Next(X1, c, α0(X1)) = {2, 7},
PΣa(L(Gϕ, 2, F ) ∩ (Σ \ Σc)
∗) = {A}
and PΣa(L(Gϕ, Next(X1, c, α0(X1)), Q \ F )
= (cc)+.(A+ cB) + cB + cc
({0}, 0)
u
c
({1, 6}, 6)
c
({1, 6}, 1)
({0, 7}, 7)({0, 7}, 0)
u
c
Fig. 7. The corresponding supervisor C
Thus, 1 c→ 2 ∈ Bad(X1, α0(X1)) and (1
c
→ 2) /∈
α1(X1). Finally, it can be shown that {(6
c
→ 7)} = α(X1).
The other values of α(X) for X ∈ Q can be computed
similarly. The resulting C is given by the LTS of Figure 7 ⋄
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VI. CONCLUSION
Given a finite transition system G over Σ and a regular
predicate Lϕ ⊆ Σ∗, we have addressed the problem of
computing a supervisor C that enforces the opacity of Lϕ
against an attacker with alphabet Σa ⊆ Σ, supposedly trying
to push G × C to reveal Lϕ (i.e. to produce an execution
s such that PΣa(s) = PΣa(s′) ⇒ s′ ∈ Lϕ for all s′ ∈
L(G×C)). We have shown how computing the optimal finite
state supervisor C with controllable (observable) alphabet Σc
(Σm) in all cases where Σc ⊆ Σm and Σa compares with
both.
We do not know yet whether the technical answer we
have provided to this problem can be extended to cope with
more complex situations, such as for instance the case where
Σc ⊆ Σm and Σa ⊆ Σm (the algorithm defined in V-
B.3 may not give the optimal supervisor in this case), or
the case where one wants to enforce simultaneously the
opacity of two predicates with respect to two attackers with
different interfaces. An important question to be studied
before applications are considered is the relation between
opacity and finite state abstraction of possibly infinite state
systems. Another topic of interest is the preservation of
opacity by algebraic operations of system composition.
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